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As much of the world’s leadership was not sure what to think of the emerging Nazi
movement in the 1920’s through the 1930’s, Truman Smith clearly saw the dark potential of a
Nazi led Germany. From 1920-1924, Smith served as assistant military attaché in Germany.
While serving, Smith was the first American diplomat to interview Hitler. Smith reported on the
manipulative sway Hitler had over the masses, as well as the danger the world could face if
Hitler gained power. Smith returned to Germany later in his career and served as head military
attaché from 1935-1939. During this stay, Smith orchestrated a wildly successful scheme to
utilize the aviator Charles Lindbergh’s fame in order to gain intelligence on German air
technology.
Together, Smith and Lindbergh provided the United States with unprecedented
intelligence on German military build-up; however, Smith’s reports were almost entirely ignored
by the Roosevelt administration. A diverse combination of domestic political factors contributed
to the poor reception Smith’s reports received. Most notably, Smith’s reports conflicted with
Roosevelt’s plan for the United States. In addition, negative consequences from Roosevelt’s
personal rivalry with Lindbergh flowed through to Smith. An examination of Smith’s story offers
a clear example of how domestic political agendas clouded decision making in the United States
government leading up to World War II.
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Introduction
Truman Smith stands in history as a little-known but interesting American hero.
After an accomplished military career leading up to and during World War II, Smith was
seemingly forgotten. Smith’s name was seldom mentioned after World War II until his
memoirs were published in 1984. Since then, intrigued historians and journalists have
sporadically examined his strange story. History shows Smith to be an astoundingly
successful figure in military intelligence. Though hampered by his lack of rank, Smith
submitted intelligence reports from Germany on the growing Nazi movement while he
was assigned to Berlin as an assistant military attaché from 1920-1924. From 1935-1938,
Smith returned to Germany to serve as head military attaché. During this time, he
submitted unprecedented reports on German military build-up. Part of the reason Smith’s
intelligence efforts were exceptionally insightful was due to a scheme he developed in the
summer of 1936 to utilize the fame of aviator Charles Lindbergh to gain better access to
German air facilities. Despite Smith’s efforts and early warnings of German military
build-up, his reports were dismissed by the Roosevelt administration. For his efforts,
Smith was illogically labeled as alarmist and later as a Nazi sympathizer. The reasons
behind these accusations were purely political. An examination of Smith’s story offers a
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clear example of how domestic political agendas clouded decision making in the United
States government leading up to World War II.
After serving in combat during World War I, Smith served as a military observer
and assistant attaché in Berlin from June 1920 to April 1924. In November of 1922,
Smith became the first American diplomat to interview Hitler and subsequently
submitted reports on Nazi developments that history shows to be nearly prophetic, even
though he lacked rank and his reports were mostly ignored. However, he did forge
relationships with German military figures that proved to be invaluable contacts when he
returned to Berlin as head military attaché later in his career. During this first stint in
Berlin, Smith submitted reports detailing Nazi movements and aims. These warnings
came nearly a decade before other more pronounced voices began warning the rest of the
world about Hitler.
In the years between 1924 and 1935, Smith held various miscellaneous posts;
most notably, from 1928 to 1932, Smith served as an instructor at the Fort Benning
Infantry School, where General George Marshall was in command. During this time,
Smith forged a close professional relationship with Marshall, and the general
subsequently acted as Smith’s patron for the remainder of his career.
Smith’s second posting in Berlin from 1935-1938 as head military attaché, which
may be the most interesting historically, can be divided into two sections. From 1935
through the first half of 1936, Smith struggled as his reports were widely dismissed by
both the military and the Roosevelt administration. In November of 1936, however,
Smith took a trip to Washington at his own expense to impress upon his military
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superiors the seriousness of events. This trip was quite successful, and Smith received
considerable support from the military going forward. In addition, Smith began utilizing
Lindbergh in his air intelligence in the summer of 1936. In combination with his newly
acquired military backing and the support of Lindbergh, Smith’s reports received
considerable circulation in the highest level of United States government from 19371938. These reports, most notably the General Air Estimate of 1937, contained powerful
language that vividly described the rapid expansion of the German military.
After Smith was diagnosed with diabetes, and subsequently exited his post in
Berlin, in December of 1938, he proceeded to work as a military adviser in Washington.
During this time, 1939-1941, Smith came under fire from various figures in the Roosevelt
administration. A diverse range of factors, most notably his history with Lindbergh,
contributed to the attacks he received. Smith entered retirement in 1941, but returned to
active duty after the attack on Pearl Harbor at the request of General Marshall. During the
war, Smith served as a military advisor to General Marshall, and he retired with the rank
of colonel in 1946.
Though Smith’s reports on Hitler from the early 1920’s are certainly historically
significant, his reports from the late 1930’s are even more so. Not only is the content of
the reports militarily important, but the reception of the reports holds complicated
political implications. Ultimately, the question remains: Why was Smith ignored? The
answer to this question is complex and varies depending on timeframe. The first factors
contributing to the reception Smith’s reports received start with domestic attitudes and
opposing voices abroad in 1935 and 1936.

Shearer 4
1935-1936 – Opposing Voices
In 1935 and 1936, Smith faced several obstacles in impressing the developments
of the German military on American leadership. The most documented explanation for
Smith’s reports being undervalued involves his position. In the 1930’s, the Military
Intelligence Division of the Army (G-2) was little respected and the position of military
attaché was far from prestigious. These factors gain little mention in contemporary
sources because allegations of Smith’s Nazi sympathy generally take the spotlight, but
the lack of respect held for the post of military attaché was a real issue for Smith in 1935
and 1936.
The lack of respect for military attachés is well documented even outside of work
referring to Smith. This poor reputation held by military attachés was matched by the
inadequacies of the Military Intelligence Division. Smith details his thoughts on G-2 and
his initial training for his 1935 Berlin post in his memoirs. Of his instruction, Smith
recalls it to have been “cursory and quite inadequate,” to the extent that Smith felt he had
gained nearly nothing from his training.1 In regards to G-2 as a whole, Smith recalls: “I
saw at first hand how inadequately organized, staffed, and financed the Military
Intelligence Division was. It became clear to me also that Military Intelligence was the
orphan branch of the General Staff and the army as a whole and that military attachés
lacked prestige and were little regarded or listened to.”2

1
2

Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 26.
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The CIA records that the struggles in G-2 were well known, and that among
military officers, the post of military attaché was considered a dead end.3 The record
provided by the CIA states that on the surface Military Intelligence presented that the
post of military attaché was highly respected, and that attachés received top-notch
training before being sent to their assignments. This image could not be further from
reality. The reputation of posts in Military Intelligence was so poor that the most
qualified officers could seldom be recruited to intelligence posts. In addition, the training
in G-2 was so inadequate that attachés were often thrown into their posts so unprepared
they could not even develop sensible reports.4
Military attachés were also extremely underfunded. The job of attachés was far
from easy: “Operating against odds, only too often in periods of tension, they must
exercise discretion in all their procedures: they must retain from spying or other
conspiratorial activities, and contacts likely to disturb regular ‘harmonious,’ peaceconductive diplomatic relations between states.”5 Within the tight pressures of not
upsetting international politics, attachés often gained the bulk of their information from
social events. Considering this, the CIA website details the struggle the attaché corps
faced in obtaining funding: “The United States was in a serious economic depression, and
Congress was not about to increase MID's budget so that a few attachés could host
cocktail parties in Paris, Berlin, Rome, London, Moscow, and Tokyo. Unfortunately, the
annual appropriations battle reinforced the perception in the Army at large that the

3

Central Intelligence Agency, “The Role of US Army Military Attachés Between the World Wars,” Last
modified June 27, 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csistudies/studies/95unclass/Koch.html#ft1.
4
Ibid.
5
Alfred Vagts, The Military Attaché (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), ix.
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attaché corps was nothing more than a well-heeled country club.”6 As Smith proved
however, much could be gained from “cocktail parties.”
Smith noted that his department’s lack of funding did limit his movements in
Berlin considerably. Notably, Smith recalls the lack of funding limited his travel in a
major way.7 In addition, Smith felt an espionage presence needed to be in Berlin,
separated from the attaché corps, and as Smith noted, “not a penny for espionage was
available to his office.”8 Overall, G-2 and the post of military attaché were neither
respected, nor funded sufficiently.
A problem Smith faced specifically concerning his post was his responsibility to
report not only on the development of German ground forces but also on their rapidly
expanding air force. Referring to himself in the third-person, Smith details the difficulty
he faced in reporting on German air development: “The military attaché possessed as
much, but no more, knowledge of air corps organization and tactics than did the average
American infantry officer who had been trained in the army school system. This was
small. His technical knowledge of air matters was negligible.”9 Kay Smith writes in her
unpublished autobiography that her husband’s lack of aeronautical expertise weighed on
him heavily, because even with his limited knowledge of air science, he knew something
huge was occurring in Germany.10
Smith attributed the lack of respect for his knowledge and the bad reputation of
his title to his feeling that his reports were not being taken seriously in the General Staff
6

CIA.
Truman Smith, 164.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid., 75-76.
10
Kay Smith, 90.
7
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or the Air Corps.11 The growing strength of the German Luftwaffe impressed Smith to
the extent that Smith returned to the States at his own expense in November 1936 in an
attempt to convince his superiors of the seriousness of events in Germany. Smith’s wife
records that this trip was successful and he did succeed in convincing much of the
military leadership he encountered of the growing threat in Germany.12
By the end of 1936, Smith had gained considerable support in the military. This
support would ultimately save his career when the political firestorm approached in 1940.
Since the lack of respect for attachés and G-2 was substantial, the backing Smith received
in Washington provided much needed support. Smith received support from, among
others, General George Marshall and Bernard Baruch. These two men in particular were
responsible for Smith’s reports being not only circulated in “the highest military
circles”13 in the late 1930’s, but they made Smith’s work known to influential figures in
the Roosevelt administration, and even the President himself.
General Marshall, who became the Chief of Staff of the Army, served as Smith’s
patron from when Smith first served under Marshall as an instructor at Fort Benning in
1928 to when Smith retired in 1946. Marshall actually sent Smith’s General Air Estimate
from November 1937 to the President as “an example of outstanding military
intelligence.”14 Marshall went on to battle the President over military appropriations, and
in this combat he relied heavily on Smith’s reports.

11

Truman Smith, 84.
Ibid., xviii.
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Ibid., xvii.
14
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12
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Bernard Baruch was a chief economic adviser to the President and was widely
known for having Roosevelt’s ear. As one of the only real “middle-men” in the politics
surrounding Smith’s story, Baruch is an interesting figure. Baruch was well liked by the
Roosevelt administration as well as the administration’s isolationist opponents.15 Baruch
described himself as somewhat “obsessed with the subject of preparedness.”16 The
reports Smith was submitting were not only being circulated widely enough that they
reached Baruch, an economic consultant to the President, but Baruch actively used
Smith’s reports in some of what he calls the “many occasions I was pressing him (FDR)
to take more decisive preparedness measures,”17 from 1936 through 1940. The value of
the support Smith received from Marshall and Baruch cannot be overstated.
Despite this support, one of the chief criticisms of Smith prior to 1937 was that
“some of his reports had exaggerated the strength of German forces, especially the air
force, in comparison with the reports of the British and French.”18 The perceived
reliability of foreign attachés was about as reputable as that of American attachés.
Vincent Orange writes in the Journal of Military History that “British intelligence
departments in the 1930s were short of staff, funds, equipment, and prestige. There were
far too many of them, they refused to cooperate with one another, and they had little
influence on decision makers, civilian or military.”19 This status was quite similar to that
of the American attaché corps, and the British attachés in Berlin handled their lack of
prestige differently than Smith did.
15

Bernard Baruch, The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 307.
Ibid., 276.
17
Ibid., 276-279.
18
Truman Smith, x.
19
Vincent Orange, "The German Air Force Is Already 'The Most Powerful in Europe': Two Royal Air
Force Officers Report on a Visit to Germany," The Journal of Military History 170, no. 4 (October, 2006): 1015,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4138193.
16
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Colonel Andrew Thorne assumed his post as head British military attaché in
Berlin in 1932. In 1934 and 1935, Thorne reached much different conclusions concerning
the state of German affairs than Smith would eventually report in 1935 and 1936. Thorne
reported that he felt the German army operated separately from Hitler’s rule. He went on
to conclude that military leaders in Germany were not particularly loyal to Hitler and
could put a stop to Hitler’s regime at any moment.20 Smith could not have disagreed
more; in fact, in his memoirs, Smith incredulously recalls a conversation he had with the
Supreme Commander of the German Luftwaffe Hermann Goering near the end of his
time in Berlin: “With moist eyes and a voice tinged with emotion, he turned to the attaché
(Smith) and said, ‘Smith, there are only three truly great characters in all history: Buddha,
Jesus Christ, and Adolf Hitler.’”21 Smith was immediately struck by the fanatical
devotion and support Hitler possessed. As early as the 1922 Smith noted about Hitler:
“So intense and dramatic were the times, and so well did Hitler understand how to play
on the emotions of his audiences, that the lack of logic in his message was often entirely
overlooked.”22 Though they were proven false not long after they were submitted,
Thorne’s reports of divided German leadership did damage the influence of Smith’s early
reports from Berlin in 1935 and 1936.
In addition, when Colonel F.E. Hotblack took over Thorne’s post in Berlin in
1935, he entered with the expectation Thorne had left for him. From 1935 through early
1937, Hotblack’s reports became less and less consistent with Thorne’s. By late 1937
when Smith submitted his most meaningful report, “The General Air Estimate of
20

Wesley Wark, "Three Military Attachés at Berlin in the 1930s: Soldier-Statesmen and the Limits of
Ambiguity," The International History Review 9, no. 4 (November, 1987): 592,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40105843.
21
Truman Smith, 100.
22
Ibid., 70.
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November 1, 1937”, Hotblack’s intelligence was in complete support of Smith. At the
time Smith submitted his General Air Estimate in 1937, Hotblack was submitting reports
to British Intelligence claiming that Germany would be prepared for an all-out offensive
against Europe within two years.23
By 1937, contradictory foreign intelligence was not an obstacle for Smith to
overcome. Prior to 1937, however, contradictory reports impacted the reception of
Smith’s reports in a major way. Thorne’s reports fueled an already raging problem in the
perception of Germany held by the United States as well as Great Britain from 1933 to
1937, which greatly impeded the impact of Smith’s reports. The idea that the Nazi state
was deeply divided was one of the worst assumptions made prior to World War II. In
seemingly wishful thinking, much of the world’s leadership became convinced that “a
policy of negotiated and limited readjustment to the international status quo would be
welcomed within the Third Reich.”24 This act of self-deception proved to be extremely
harmful, and it brings up another problem Smith faced in Berlin at the hands of the
United States ambassador, Dr. William Dodd.
Dodd was well known to be a pacifist who had a “marked distaste for military
matters.”25 He did not like to associate himself with military men; instead, the doctor
enjoyed the company of professors in Germany. He had no confidence in Army and
Naval attachés in Berlin: “Army and Navy attachés here, and I think all over Europe, are
utterly unequal to their supposed functions.”26 Dodd consistently battled the idea that
Germany was militarizing. Even when the military attaché preceding Smith, Colonel
23

Wark, 599.
Ibid., 593.
25
Truman Smith, 76.
26
Vagts, 71.
24
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Wuest, raised the alarm and tried to alert the United States that Germany was mobilizing
for war, Dodd insisted that Wuest was overly excited, and what Wuest had to say was not
even worth listening to.27 While Dodd asserted that Wuest and Smith were both alarmist,
he was proven wrong when the Germans took over the Rhineland in 1936. This risky act
from Hitler, which Smith reported would happen a few days beforehand, completely
shocked Dodd.28
The well-educated ambassador had long been a critic of Hitler, but despite his
criticism, he completely underestimated the fiery dictator. When news broke that Hitler
had indeed moved into the Rhineland just as Smith had predicted, Dodd abandoned his
fellow diplomats to discuss his disgust at Hitler with his professor friends. In the process,
Dodd found that his cohorts were in fact Nazis themselves, a fact that shocked and
appalled the ambassador to the extent that he hid himself inside his study. This event
caused Dodd to become disgusted with military matters in general, to the extent that he
would not even appear with any American military officers if they were in their uniforms.
This behavior lasted, at the cost of tax-payers’ dollars, until his dismissal from his post
for inadequate performance in late 1937.29
This complete underestimation of Hitler exhibited by Dodd represents a much
wider feeling within the United State government in the 1930s. The impact of Smith’s
reports was compromised not only by Dodd, but also by the general lack of concern with
German military build-up present in much of the United States. When Smith began his
post in 1935 in Berlin, the global politics were in a complicated stage in which all
27

Ibid., 71.
Kay Smith, 83-85.
29
Ibid., 86.
28
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military intelligence needed to be carefully weighed and considered. Instead, Smith
recalls that at no point during his time in Berlin did Dr. Dodd ever ask any information
from Smith on German developments.30 This attitude exhibited by Dodd explains much
of why Smith’s reports from 1935 and 1936 were ignored.
In reality, though Smith consistently reported on German mobilization for his
entire service in Berlin, his reports in 1937 and 1938 offer the most insight into the state
of the United States government at the time. Several barriers stood in the way of Smith’s
reports in 1935 and 1936, but by 1937, these obstacles had been conquered. In 1937,
Dodd had lost credibility, Smith had gained immense support from his military superiors,
and Smith gained a new assistant air attaché, Major Albert Vanaman, who possessed top
of the line aeronautical expertise.31 Considering these factors, along with the support he
received from Baruch and Marshall, when Smith submitted the most important report of
his service in Berlin, his “General Air Estimate of November 1, 1937,” it effectively had
a direct path to the highest levels of the Roosevelt administration. The continued poor
reception Smith’s reports received ultimately give insight into domestic political
priorities in the 1930’s, the ultimate hindrance impacting Smith’s intelligence efforts.
1937-1938 – Domestic Priorities
Hitler’s rise to power in Germany stands as one of the most gravely
underestimated events in history. Across the globe, Hitler was regarded as little more
than a dupe by many. Even in Germany, Franz Von Papen, who convinced President Paul
von Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as chancellor, was so confident that Hitler was weak

30
31

Truman Smith, 77.
Ibid., 106.
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and could easily be controlled that he boldly claimed: “Within two months we will have
pushed Hitler so far into the corner that he’ll squeak!”32 Events, of course, went much
differently than Papen anticipated, and while Hitler was being underestimated in
Germany, a comical image was simultaneously being created of him in the United States.
One of the starts of the outrageous picture of Hitler came from the book I Saw
Hitler by Dorothy Thompson. In her book, which stemmed from her 1931 interview with
the soon-to-be leader of Germany, Thompson clearly and colorfully described Hitler as
feminine, socially backward, and mentally fragile.33 Thompson also openly questioned
Hitler’s ability to lead; she states in her writing that entering her interview: “I was
convinced that I was meeting the future dictator of Germany. In something less than fifty
seconds I was quite sure that I was not.”34 Time magazine also reported on Hitler as a
silly figure, making light of his appearance as a “pudgy, stoop-shouldered man” and
highlighting anything strange about him.35 Time also went on to fuel an unfortunate and
common misconception that the Nazi party was “pledged to so many things that it is
pledged to nothing.”36 This perception of Hitler was quite common in the United States in
the mid-1930s and ultimately reduced the impact of Smith’s reports, as well as detracted
from the plight of Jews in America and in Germany.
The common doubt over the seriousness of Hitler’s regime was a major detriment
to Smith and his reports. With the exception of Jews, the majority of Americans were
unconcerned with Hitler. In addition, the concerns and protests voiced by Jews in

32
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America ultimately did as much harm to their own cause as it helped. Rabbis openly
criticized Hitler and predicted that he would lead the world to another world war.37 On
May 11th 1933, fifty-thousand Jews even gathered in Chicago to protest the oppression
against Jews in Germany.38 Though this protest actually did not have a huge effect on the
public, it did touch Edith Rodgers, a Massachusetts Republican in the U.S. House of
Representatives. On May 13th, two days after the protest, Rodgers voiced in the House
her feeling that the United States should intervene in Germany to aid the suffering Jews
there.39 Directly after Rodgers addressed the House with her opinion, however, the
President released a statement emphasizing that any actions by the Nazis were strictly
European affairs.40
The public was generally in favor of this isolationist policy. Anti-Jewish
sentiments were extremely common in the United States in the pre-World War II era,41
which combined with a Nazi propaganda barrage to eliminate much of the sympathy
Americans had for German Jews. Truman Smith recalls in his memoirs that Hitler was
outspoken in his speeches against the Jews, but that the common belief was his violent
rhetoric was exclusively for propaganda purposes, and that the dictator would never
actually become too abusive to Jews.42

37
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Jewish businessmen also had their own scheme turned against them by the Nazis
when they attempted to boycott German goods on a global scale.43 Before Jews began
implementing this boycott, the Nazis had already begun issuing “warnings” to Jews in
general, stating that if they kept up their “treachery”, there would be major
ramifications.44 After the boycott was implemented, the Nazis launched their counterattack, claiming that by boycotting German goods, the Jews were simply extending their
treachery. The Nazis further decided to reciprocate and boycott Jewish goods and
services and to begin removing more Jews from positions of importance.45
While the nation was being influenced by German propaganda, President
Roosevelt was actually aware of the true story in Germany. Dr. Dodd reported to the
President on the abuses that German Jews were experiencing, but Roosevelt responded
that the Jews were essentially on their own.46 While much of the public simply was not
sure what to think about Nazi Germany, the President was aware of the situation and
chose to place his New Deal as the main priority of the United States government.
To those whom history remembers as the “New Dealers,” the New Deal
represented much more than the social reform it literally entailed; it represented hope that
democracy was still a viable system of government. In the midst of dictatorships and
communism, Roosevelt wanted to turn his New Deal into somewhat of a “shining light”
for democracy.47 Roosevelt wanted his program to rise above the attacks from his
opponents, who called the New Deal the “Jew Deal” and questioned Roosevelt’s

43
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motives.48 In hopes of preserving his New Deal’s funding from being spent elsewhere in
response to escalated arms concerns, the President put much of his faith in global
disarmament as a foreign policy strategy.
The President put a large amount of effort into pushing disarmament to preserve
peace. Those who advocated for military preparedness, many of whom were isolationists,
did not agree with Roosevelt on arms.49 Bernard Baruch is recorded as quoting: “Peace
does not follow disarmament; disarmament follows peace.”50 This policy of Roosevelt’s
did what he wanted it to do, however, because it allowed him to justify postponing much
needed military funding and slash military appropriations to create funds to dump into the
New Deal.
Though eventually they faded behind larger events in history surrounding World
War II, many criticisms arose against the President because of how he handled Smith’s
reports. Smith described the press coverage of his activities with Lindbergh in Berlin to
be highly inaccurate. He believed that the press simplified German affairs and
contributed to the misconception that Germany was weak and divided. Despite this, the
fact remains that they did receive substantial exposure in the press because of the
presence of Lindbergh.51 As Smith’s reports began being covered up by the Roosevelt
administration, General Marshall even went so far as to submit Smith’s reports to
external political figures who were not afraid to battle the Roosevelt administration in
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order to keep the reports from being completely forgotten and to prevent the work of
Smith going unrecognized.52
Almost entirely due to this action taken by General Marshall, accusations
developed that the President had purposefully withheld Smith’s reports from Congress in
order to remove them as a barrier to slashing the military appropriations.53 These
accusations climaxed when Representative Albert Engel, a Michigan Republican,
provided well-documented evidence that showed how the President cut the annual
military appropriations by forty million dollars, despite having been aware of Smith’s
reports.54 Though Smith recalls Engel’s attack on the President as being of a completely
partisan nature, the fact remains that Roosevelt was adamant that the New Deal needed to
take priority, even when it meant sweeping Smith’s unprecedented but unpalatable
reports under the rug.55
Events surrounding Smith’s reports offer insight into the Roosevelt administration
and the battle for military appropriations that raged through the 1930s. The President
opposed heavy military spending up until 1938 when the Sudeten crisis and Kristallnacht
began to impact the views of American citizens. As Nazi aggression became to be more
apparent, and Nazi troops trashed Jewish businesses and abused their owners, American
public opinion began to see past the propaganda war Germany had launched against the
Jews.56 Public opinion shifted even further against the Nazis when in 1939 and 1940, the
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Germans overran Poland, Denmark and Norway.57 Finally, in the summer of 1940, when
Germany began attacking Western Europe, General Marshall successfully acquired
sufficient funding for the military to begin preparing for the possibility of conflict.58
The extensive fight and delay over the military appropriations is explained in
three primary reasons by Bernard Baruch in his diaries. First, Baruch explains that
Roosevelt was essentially a control freak, and he liked having leverage over his
subordinates. A second reason was actually that the President was weary of industry
dominating the economy, an issue he felt like could happen if large military spending was
instituted. The third factor Baruch lists is that Roosevelt did not want to stir the pot
before the election in which he ran for his third term.59
Indeed, the military suffered mightily at the hands of the domestic politics.
General Marshall thought the narrow-mindedness of politicians was handicapping the
military and felt it was important for the United States to be ready for war.60 Similarly to
Marshall’s feelings concerning the military, Bernard Baruch was quite concerned with
the inadequacy of the American military.61 Baruch also mentions, however, that the
President was also quite aware and concerned about how unprepared the United States
would be if attacked.62 This presents an interesting quandary; the President slashed
military budgets to create more funds for his New Deal, but he also harbored concerns of
preparedness, and wanted to “shake Americans from their isolationist delusions before it
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was too late.”63 If Roosevelt was concerned with military preparedness, and wanted to act
against isolationism, why would he cover up Truman Smith’s reports? If anything, one
would think Roosevelt could have used Smith’s reports as evidence to support military
buildup.
The largest reason for Roosevelt’s action concerning Smith’s reports came down
to the same factor that many of the President’s decisions hinged on: timing. Exactly at
what point the Roosevelt administration’s agenda changed from an isolationist one to an
interventionist one is a topic for another paper, but one point is clear, and that is the
President was extremely mindful of timing in relation to where public opinion rested at a
particular point in time. In the mid-1930s, regardless of how concerned Roosevelt was
with the military, the New Deal received “top legislative priority” over foreign policy
decisions and “the outside world would have to fend for itself.”64 This attitude is
consistent with how the President responded to the fifty-thousand Jews that protested
against the Nazis in Chicago in 1933. The President had certainly shifted gears, however,
by the late 1930s, when he began his attempt to sway public opinion in favor of war.65
If Smith’s timing in Berlin had been slightly different, his story would be
remembered in a much different way and may have changed the course of world history.
Instead, Smith’s reports were consistently at odds with the President’s agenda. In 1935
and 1936, Smith’s reports contradicted the cuts Roosevelt wanted to implement to
military funding, and in 1937 through 1938, Smith’s reports did not line up with the
complex plan Roosevelt put in place to systematically shift public opinion. Smith’s
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reports came across as abrupt and startling, and the President was against shocking the
public.
A major problem Smith saw in military intelligence was the robotic nature of
aeronautical reports. In his memoirs Smith described air reports as “so bulky, statistical,
and technical that anyone who read them needed both leisure and training in all branches
of aeronautical knowledge to absorb their information.”66 In his “General Air Estimate of
November 1, 1937,” Smith aimed to create a “brief, all inclusive, and couched in
dramatic rather than technical terms” summary of Germany air progress.67 Smith
certainly succeeded in this effort, providing the War Department with a relatively brief
but detailed overview of the German Luftwaffe and its immense development. Lindbergh
was a vital part in the preparation of this report, and his influence is clear when reading it.
The language is dramatic, to the point and would be understandable to nearly any reader.
Dramatic reports on German might, however, were the last things Roosevelt wanted to
reach the public.
Indeed, alarming reports of the huge air power in Germany could incite panic in
the United States. The political weight of air superiority at the time cannot be
underestimated. Just before World War II, the world was transitioning into a time when,
as Lindbergh stated: “We can no longer protect our families with an army. Our libraries,
our museums, every institution we value most, are laid bare to bombardment.”68
Considering the vast concern and fear surrounding air power, the President did not want
any shocking news to develop and panic the public.
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A prime goal of the President was to keep the public calm. He “deliberately
sought, with the collaboration of the mass media, to avoid controversy and to stifle
national debate.”69 Roosevelt ultimately wanted to stifle any shocking news, and he
pushed propaganda that tried to illustrate that the government leaders in America were
more than capable of handling any complex foreign policy decisions that came their way.
Rather than pushing the public into anxiety over the unsettling events of the world,
Roosevelt succeeded in producing a “dull, steady, pervasive drum of preparedness
information emanating from every popular source of public education.”70 Roosevelt
manipulated the press in order to essentially “sell” his administration.
Roosevelt’s interference in the media went as far as to force the removal of press
figures that were critical of his administration’s foreign policy stances. One of the most
notable instances of the President’s influence on the media was when the White House
caused the removal of one of CBS’s most popular news commentators, Boake Carter, for
being critical of the Roosevelt administration. In contrast, figures that were far more
derogatory towards the President’s rivals than Carter was against the administration, like
Walter Winchell, were praised. 71 Ultimately, the President saw foreign policy issues
leading up to World War II to be too serious to be up for debate. Roosevelt thought he
knew what was best for the United States and aimed to influence the public into offering
the least amount of resistance to his agenda as possible.72 Considering the President’s
attitude, the motive for covering up Smith’s reports is clear. In his effort to impress
German buildup on American leadership, Smith actually doomed his own reports,
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because they were too alarming and unpalatable to be utilized in the Roosevelt
administration’s agenda.
Smith ultimately found himself at constant odds with the Roosevelt
administration. If his reports being contrary to the agenda of the administration were not
enough, Smith’s association with Lindbergh ultimately caused him to be dragged into a
fierce political battle. The rivalry between Lindbergh and Roosevelt had a deeply
polarizing impact in the United States population. The rhetoric on both sides was
radically misrepresentative of the other side, and Smith was made a target for his
relationship with Lindbergh.
1939-1940 – Political Strife
Starting heavily in the summer of 1940, Smith began being attacked by several
members in the Roosevelt administration as a Nazi sympathizer. Though labeled as a
sympathizer, these accusations were fueled less by actual suspicions of Nazi sympathy
and more so by a political grudge. The impact Smith’s relationship with Lindbergh had
on these attacks cannot be underestimated. Smith was dragged into a confrontation that
started as early as 1934. In early 1934, after an investigation into corruption in
commercial air lines and their contracts involving air mail, Roosevelt ordered an
immediate halt on all commercial air mail. The task of transporting airmail he handed
entirely to the Army. This order turned out to be a tremendous mistake by the President,
and one of which Lindbergh quickly became a vocal opponent. Lindbergh, who at the
time possessed fame and influence not matched by even the most famous of celebrities
today, immediately spoke out against the President’s painting of all commercial airlines
with the same brush. Most of all, Lindbergh warned against the policy and predicted that
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Roosevelt’s hasty action compromised the safety of untrained Army airmen who were
being volunteered for the airmail service.73
Between February 1934, when Roosevelt instituted his ban on commercial
airmail, and April 1934, twelve airmen had been killed due to their lack of training. By
the summer, Roosevelt’s ban on commercial airmail had effectively been lifted, and the
entire situation “constituted a personal defeat for Roosevelt in the court of public
opinion.”74 This interaction between Lindbergh and Roosevelt proved to be the beginning
of a conflict which soon tore much of the country apart.
Roosevelt generally discredited any of his opposition as either ignorant or
unpatriotic. Lindbergh certainly received this treatment. The President’s priority through
it all was to eliminate forces that would undermine his sway on public opinion. Roosevelt
was extremely concerned with “not getting ahead” of public thought. In general, the
President’s agendas were fairly open-ended.75 Rather than push detailed plans, Roosevelt
tried to steer public opinion to where he thought it should be. This typical political
strategy was not compatible with conflicting viewpoints. Alarming forces that could
disrupt his efforts were either covered up, like Smith’s reports, or combatted, like
Lindbergh’s rhetoric. When Lindbergh began giving his isolationist speeches, he was
even approached with a bribe from the President. If Lindbergh decided to halt his
speeches, the President would create a new Cabinet position for him.76 Whether through
bribery or smear campaigns, Roosevelt did everything he could to silence or discredit his
opposition. These methods aimed at Lindbergh ultimately spilled over onto Smith.
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In his memoirs, Smith lists influential gossip columnist and radio broadcaster
Walter Winchell among his antagonists.77 Winchell was opposed to everything
isolationist. As he accused Lindbergh, who he named the “Lone Ostrich,” of being a
Nazi, Winchell also sent messages to Roosevelt claiming that Smith was an “advisor on
the Lindbergh speeches” and called Smith a “terrific Pro-Nazi.”78 Famous broadcaster
and journalist Dorothy Thompson, who like Smith was one of the earliest voices to speak
out against Hitler, was openly skeptical of Smith as well.79 The popular columnist and
critic of public figures Drew Pearson was also outspoken about the questions surrounding
Smith’s allegiances.80
Smith was effectively lumped into the isolationist group which was being blasted
in the media. Though some columnists directly attacked Smith, he also felt the pressure
of the polar media war occurring in the United States. From gossip columnists to news
broadcasters to even cartoonists, the media lost all objectivity. Even Dr. Seuss took
merciless shots at Lindbergh. In his cartoons, Dr. Seuss repeatedly portrayed isolationists
with the popular image of ostriches with their heads in the sand. Further than this,
however, Seuss had multiple images published portraying Lindbergh as being in league
with Nazi Germany.81
In addition to these influential members of the press who openly doubted Smith’s
patriotism, many more columnists simply lumped Smith in with their criticisms of
77
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Lindbergh. Shortly after Smith returned to the United States, Lindbergh began a long
campaign to spread isolationism, in which he delivered speeches that were broadcasted
across the nation and internationally in many instances. These opinionated broadcasts
quickly became surrounded in controversy as the nation became split down the middle
between isolationists and interventionists. Many columnists, particularly ones who had
more liberal stances, were quick to point out how fond the Germans were of Lindbergh,
and how all of his speeches were broadcasted and cheered for by Nazis.82 The extensive
smearing of Lindbergh eventually created a perception of Smith that essentially made
him “guilty by association” and made him receive most of the “echoed accusations that
were hurled at Lindbergh.”83
Smith was similarly associated with Lindbergh by prominent members of the
Roosevelt administration. Among those whom Smith called the “New Dealers who
wanted his scalp” were figures like Supreme Court Justice and personal friend of
Roosevelt, Felix Frankfurter, who Smith claimed was fueling some of the press attacks.84
White House Press Secretary under Roosevelt, Stephen Early, also spoke out against
Smith.85 Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, another critic, even approached
General George Marshall to request that Smith be discharged from the Army.86
Likely the most vocal opponent of Smith from the Roosevelt administration,
however, was Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. Smith recalls an instance in 1940
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where Ickes, along with Justice Frankfurter, suggested to the President that Smith should
be court-martialed.87 Ickes helped to lead a unit in the Roosevelt administration which
tracked the President’s rivals.88 Lindbergh described Ickes’ actions as “spreading
misinformation” in the “cheapest and most inexcusable sort of way.”89 The pressure
being put on Smith was intense enough that Smith and his wife Kay became convinced
they were being spied on and had their phones tapped.90
The 1940 press attacks on Smith did not end until Bernard Baruch convinced the
President to order a halt on the smear campaign. Baruch did this in league with General
Marshall.91 Ickes did not give up, though; shortly after the President ordered a halt on
members of the administration fueling press attacks on Smith, Ickes orchestrated a new
attack. Smith soon found himself the subject of an investigation, because it had been
reported Smith insulted and questioned the intelligence of the President at a cocktail
party. This fabrication was later discovered to have been devised by Ickes, and was
utterly disproven.92
The heightened aggressiveness of Ickes was largely due to his staunch opposition
to racism. Ickes was a vocal opponent of racial discrimination of all kinds,93 and as
history has documented well, much of Lindbergh’s rhetoric was racially charged.
Lindbergh was quite vocal in blaming Jews for trying to agitate the American public into
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moving towards war.94 Ickes made it a priority to try to disrupt and nullify anything that
had to do with Lindbergh. In his diary, Ickes expresses great jubilance when his smear
campaign began to crawl under Lindbergh’s skin.95 In correspondence between Ickes and
Roosevelt, Ickes described Lindbergh as a “ruthless and conscious fascist, motivated by a
hatred for you personally and a contempt for democracy in general,” to which the
President responded: “What you say about Lindbergh and the potential danger of the
man, I agree with wholeheartedly.”96 The seriousness of these feelings toward Lindbergh
deeply impacted the perception of Smith in the Roosevelt administration. The FBI even
kept a record of Smith in their file on Charles Lindbergh, in which they list Smith among
potential threats as allegedly being “strangely pro-Nazi.”97 Ickes and his fellow critics felt
they were doing their country a service by exposing those who, in their minds, were Nazi
sympathizers.98
The overall theme of Smith’s career tends to be that an outstanding military man
was dragged into politics against his will. Much like his patron General Marshall, who
tried his hardest to remain separated from partisan politics, Smith maintained a marked
aloofness to politics.99 Even when he found himself being ridiculed and smeared, Smith
kept his cool. During the attacks on him, Smith never once even responded. Throughout
the attacks, Smith kept his head down and did his duty, and trusted General Marshall to
take care of the attacks.100 Though much of the small amount of history that includes
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Smith will remember him as “that guy” who brought Lindbergh to Germany, Smith’s
career offers a variety of learning opportunities.
Conclusion
While contemporary sources try to isolate reasons why Smith’s reports were
covered up, the reality remains that the poor reception of his reports was due to a diverse
collection of domestic political factors. Smith was swept into political rivalries, and the
value of his intelligence efforts was diminished. Smith’s case and the fate of his reports
remind us that the polarized nature of politics in the early 21st century is hardly unique.
Even today, opinions vary concerning the events surrounding Smith’s career.
Many of these differences relate directly to the diversity in views on the rivalry between
Roosevelt and Lindbergh. The majority of research conducted specifically on Smith’s
career tell a story of a dutiful officer who was treated unfairly by the Roosevelt
administration; however, not all contemporary sources agree. Though the research
focused on Smith is limited, examinations of the rivalry between Lindbergh and
Roosevelt are not. In these works, Smith is often mentioned in passing, but these brief
glimpses of his career are skewed based on the biases of the author concerned. In the
majority of contemporary work, Smith is paired with Lindbergh; thus, the perception of
Lindbergh is key in the portrayal Smith receives. Some authors praise Lindbergh’s
contributions to Smith’s intelligence effort and subsequently admire Smith’s
performance. Others label Lindbergh as the Roosevelt administration did, as a Nazi
sympathizer, and include Smith in their accusations.
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Charles Lindbergh stands as one of the most polarizing public figures in
American history. Even today, historians bicker on whether or not he contributed to the
United States or was little more than a traitor. These issues were magnified in the years
leading up to World War II and ultimately caused Smith’s intelligence work to be pushed
aside in the midst of debates about matters other than the substance of his reports.
Looking back, Smith is not shy to admit his short comings. In his memoirs, Smith
describes how his intelligence office completely overlooked the development of German
missile technology. In addition, Smith recalls that through much of the early stages of
German military buildup, the nature of German air tactics escaped him. Air forces had
never before been utilized to support ground forces, and Smith did not realize the Nazi
regime planned to use their mighty Luftwaffe in this way until late 1937. Smith considers
this oversight a massive blunder in his memoirs.101
Despite these failures, the successes of Smith’s intelligence efforts cannot be
underestimated. Though his work on the German Luftwaffe is generally the focus of
research due to Lindbergh’s involvement, Smith also reported on German ground forces.
The intelligence turned into the United States government regarding German ground
forces by Smith was profoundly accurate. In addition to this, the work Smith
accomplished on German air developments, with the help of Lindbergh, remained
unprecedented. Smith was not without faults during his service, but his utilization of
Lindbergh caused his intelligence to yield much more meaningful results than his foreign
counterparts in Berlin. Despite the stellar content of Smith’s reports, the United States
government remained aloof to the gravity of Germany’s military expansion.
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In the early 21st century, politics remain one of the most polarizing topics in
existence. Vicious political disputes often take center stage in American politics over
meaningful events occurring both domestically and internationally. Smith’s story clearly
shows this dividing effect is hardly a new occurrence. In addition, this case study offers
as a cautionary tale about the importance of listening to opposing viewpoints, and it also
gives insight into the dangers of allowing policy making to hinge on political agendas.
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